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Abstract  
Using a panel of international student test scores 1980 – 2000 (PISA and TIMSS), panel fixed 
effects estimates suggest that government spending decentralization is conducive to student 
performance. The effect does not appear to be mediated through levels of educational 
spending.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In political economy and public finance, the linkage between government decentralization and 
the quality of public sector services has been much debated. However, empirical evidence is 
limited since, in general, the quality of public sector activities is hard to measure, and 
decentralization varies mainly across countries. In this paper we utilize a country panel based 
on several comparative international achievement tests of students to quantify the quality of 
compulsory education, and estimate the effect of public sector spending decentralization 
within a panel data framework. 
 
 
2. Related literature 
 
Oates (1972) argues that, in general, more decentralized political decision-making allows 
better adjustment of (local) supplies to locally heterogeneous demands. In the model of 
Hoxby (1999), public school productivity is higher with decentralized financing through local 
property taxes since Tiebout mechanisms reveal important information on local preferences. 
In Seabright’s (1996) framework with incomplete contracts, the main advantage of 
decentralization is that it is easier to hold decision-makers accountable. For other, possibly 
detrimental effects of decentralization, see, e.g., Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer (2008).   
 
In the economics of education literature, the empirical evidence mainly supports the view that 
decentralized education systems improve on student achievement. In a cross-country analysis, 
Wößmann (2003) finds that school autonomy exerts a beneficial impact. Hoxby and Rockoff 
(2004) report that autonomous charter schools perform better than public sector schools in the 
US, Clark (2009) identifies a positive effect of a major reform granting larger school 
autonomy in the U.K. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2002) show that the decision to decentralize 
public education in the early 1990s raised student achievement in Argentina, while Naper 
(2010) reports that decentralized hiring of teachers increases school effectiveness in Norway. 
On the other hand, Merrouche (2007) finds that decentralization of education spending 
responsibility in Spain did not affect the illiteracy rate. Regarding general government 
decentralization, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) identify for 26 Swiss states a positive effect 
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on the share of high school graduates in the 19-year old population. The literature is 
inconclusive on whether measures of school spending decentralization just approximate 
general government decentralization, or whether educational decentralization is important per 
se.  
 
 
3. The Model and Data 
 
Our empirical model focuses on the relationship between school quality and public sector 
decentralization. We define school quality in terms of achievement in test scores obtained 
from all six available comparative international achievement tests from 1980 to 2000 
assessing students aged 13-15 years.1 We use the national average of the scores in 
mathematics and natural science tests, and standardize them in order to ensure comparability 
across tests. Our procedure standardizes the test scores for the most frequently participating 
(“core”) countries. For each test, the mean of our adjusted score is set equal to zero with 
standard deviation of unity within the group of “core” countries. For a given test, the overall 
average value then depends on the test performance in “non-core” countries, and consequently 
on which “non-core” countries participated or not.2  
 
Decentralization is commonly defined as the percentage of sub-national government spending 
in general government spending, calculated by the World Bank up to 1999.3 Keman (2000) 
and Treisman (2000) argue that it is important to distinguish discretion in terms of financial 
policy implementations by local administrations (‘the right to act’), which we measure 
directly, from local government political autonomy (‘the right to decide’), which we capture 
only indirectly. Any reform in government decentralization may need some time to influence 
behavior. The size of the lag will depend on to what extent the change in decentralization was 
expected and student learning is cumulative. We will use a lag of one year in the 
                                               
1
 We use the results of the SIMS and SISS tests conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement (IEA) in 1980-81 and 1983-85, respectively, the IAEP test in 1990-91, IEA’s TIMSS 
tests in 1994-95 and 1998-99, and the OECD PISA test in 2000. 
2
 For a detailed description of the standardization procedure, see Falch and Fischer (2008a).  
3
 The index is more closely described in Dreher and Fischer (2010).  
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decentralization variable to account for sluggish responses, but will also present results from 
models allowing for more lags in the variable of interest. 
 
In addition, the empirical model includes as co-variates GDP per capita, population size, and 
the size of the public sector that insures against income shocks, particularly government social 
expenditures and government consumption spending (for sources see Falch and Fischer, 
2008a).4 Country fixed effects account for time-invariant features such as institutions and 
culture (e.g., the national school system, school autonomy, population preferences, etc.). They 
are expected to mitigate potential endogeneity biases. We also include a dummy variable for 
the only OECD PISA test in the regression sample. 
 
The way the dependent variable is constructed is an argument for not including time fixed 
effects in the baseline model. With time fixed effects, the within-country variation in student 
performance would depend on the composition of participating countries in the specific tests. 
The motivation for the standardizing procedure we apply is exactly to avoid this flaw. 
However, to assess the robustness of the specification, we test for the presence of time effects. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
For reasons of comparability, we restrict the sample to well-established OECD countries (as 
of 1990) with relatively stable political and administrative systems, excluding the post-
communist countries. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The standard deviation of the 
dependent variable is close to unity. On average, local government spending constitutes 31 
percent of total government spending, varying from four percent (Greece) to almost 60 
percent (Canada). For all variables, the within-variation seems to be sufficiently large to 
justify a country fixed effects specification. 
 
 
                                               
4
 We have also estimated models including the population share with at least a secondary education. The t-value 
of this variable was always below unity, and values are missing for some observations. 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 provides the regression outcomes. Column (1) presents the simple correlation 
between spending decentralization and test score. The relationship is positive but small. The 
remaining models (columns (2) to column (10)) include country fixed effects.  
 
Comparing the results in columns (1) and (2), we observe that including country fixed effects 
and covariates increases the size of the effect of decentralization (0.021 vs. 0.072) and its 
significance level (10 percent vs. 5 percent). In the full model (2), the result implies that rising 
spending decentralization by 10 percentage points increases student test scores by 0.7 
standard deviations. This is a non-trivial effect given that three countries in the sample have 
within-variations in decentralization larger than 5 percentage points.  
 
Model 2 does not include time specific effects as explained above, but a dummy variable for 
the PISA test of the year 2000, which is highly significant. Notice, however, that if time 
specific effects are included, they are jointly insignificant.5  Column (3) in Table 2 replaces 
the PISA dummy variable with a time trend, without affecting the coefficient size of 
decentralization (0.074 vs. 0.072). Since the trend is not significant at conventional levels, the 
remaining models presented include only the PISA dummy variable but exclude the time 
trend. Excluding any time variable increases the effect of decentralization to 0.088 (column 
(4)). 
 
The results in Table 2 also imply that student performance is not affected by GDP or 
population size. Regarding GDP, there may be an endogeneity problem in the long-run 
because of a growth enhancing effect of student achievement (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). 
However, excluding GDP does not alter the coefficient size of decentralization.  
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
                                               
5
 The p-value on a test for joint significance using the model specification in column (2) in Table 2 is 0.47. 
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Public Sector Size 
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 2 show that the positive effect of decentralization is robust to 
the inclusion of public sector size, measured by either total government consumption 
spending or government social expenditures (0.074 and 0.073, respectively). The effect of 
decentralization does not appear to be mediated through government spending activities. Both 
public sector size coefficients are negative and of similar magnitude as reported in Falch and 
Fischer (2008a), but insignificant, probably due to fewer observations in the present analysis. 
 
Given that decentralization increases student achievement while government size tends to 
reduce it, one would expect, in line with the finding for life satisfaction in Bjørnskov et al. 
(2008), that decentralization is more advantageous in the case of large governments than with 
small governments. Columns (7) and (8) add interaction terms between government size and 
decentralization. Contradicting our hypothesis, both interaction terms are negative. The 
performance-enhancing effect appears to decline in public sector size. One might speculate 
whether market distortions through non-internalization of inter-jurisdictional spillovers 
increase more in decentralized countries than in centralized countries as the government’s 
involvement in the economy rises. The interaction terms are small, however, and only 
significant at the 10 percent level for social spending. The overall effect of decentralization is 
positive for the within-sample variation in social expenditures, for which it varies from 0.05 
to 0.08.6 
 
Robustness tests on decentralization 
One may suspect that the small within-country variation in the decentralization measure is due 
to minor changes in, e.g., accounting rules rather than changes in the real economy. However, 
some of the variation is clearly real. For example, the dip in decentralization by 3.5 
percentage points in Germany in 1991 is a unification effect: The East German Laender were 
fiscally far less autonomous than the West German Laender. The continuous decline from 
1991 on reflects the growing dependence of the East German Laender on federal transfers. 
The ongoing decrease in decentralization in Switzerland from 1990 on by roughly 0.5 
percentage points per year seems to be related to continuously rising unemployment and old-
                                               
6
 The estimated coefficients can readily be interpreted because all interacted variables are centered. For centered 
log of social spending the within-variation ranges from -0.248 to 0.198. 
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age pension expenditures at the federal level. Sweden experienced relatively large fluctuations 
in decentralization in the 1990s related to the major recession at the start of the decade and the 
governmental reforms that followed it. We have estimated the model on subsamples of 
countries with relatively small and large changes in decentralization, and find that the effect 
of decentralization is stable.7  
 
The response time of student performance to changes in decentralization is not clear from 
economic theory, but one might expect that some time passes by before structural changes 
start having an effect. The model in column (9) of Table 2 uses five year moving averages of 
all explanatory variables. This specification also smoothes out minor fluctuations in the 
decentralization measure due to, e.g., changes in accounting rules. The effect of 
decentralization is now slightly smaller (0.062), but still significant at the 10 percent level. 
When testing for a more sluggish response to changes in fiscal decentralization, employing a 
three-year (two-year) lag of the variable of interest, we obtain a coefficient of 0.052 (0.062) 
(both significant at the 5 percent level, not reported).  
 
Column (10) in Table 2 investigates one potential transmission channel for the effect of 
spending decentralization. We test the hypothesis that decentralization influences student 
performance through public expenditures levels in compulsory education (e.g. Fischer, 2005). 
Column (10) adds to model (2) primary school expenditures per pupil as percent of GDP8, but 
the effect is clearly insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient of decentralization stays 
significant (0.100), indicating that its effect is not transmitted through educational spending.9  
 
                                               
7
 Five countries have within-country standard deviation in decentralization above 2.5 in the regression sample 
(Sweden, USA, Iceland, Switzerland, and Germany). For this subsample of 17 observations, the coefficient 
(standard error) of decentralization is 0.088 (0.048). For the other countries (68 observations), the coefficient is 
0.066 (0.046), and a statistical test cannot reject that the coefficients are equal (p-value of 0.74). When the 
sample is split into two equal-sized sub-samples of countries with small and large within-country variation in 
decentralization, the coefficients are 0.071 (0.074) and 0.083 (0.039), respectively. 
8
 This data are obtained from the World Bank education database. In this database, there is much less 
observations for secondary education than for primary education. 
9
 In principle, fiscal spending decentralization may only approximate decentralization of government spending 
on education, a finding that would be in congruence with the school autonomy effects referred above (section 2). 
Unfortunately, a measure for education spending decentralization is only available from 1997 on, which makes a 
thorough test of the hypothesis impossible. However, the preliminary findings in Falch and Fischer (2008b) 
suggest that it is general decentralization and not school decentralization which matters. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
A panel data analysis of international student test scores suggests that government spending 
decentralization is beneficial to student performance. This general decentralization effect 
appears not to be mediated by levels of educational spending. Our analysis also suggests that 
this advantageous effect decreases in public sector size. However, further research appears 
necessary on the transmission mechanisms through which the positive effect of local policy 
implementation works.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Std.dev. 
within 
Min Max 
Test score -0.34 1.00 0.44 -2.86 2.10 
Decentralization, lagged 31.3 14.2 1.61 3.84 58.7 
Population size (log) 16.7 1.54 0.05 12.5 19.5 
GDP per capita (log) 10.0 0.28 0.15 8.72 10.8 
Social spending as % of GDP (log) 2.95 0.28 0.09 1.76 3.48 
Government consumption spending as % of GDP (log) 2.94 0.20 0.06 2.41 3.39 
Primary educational spending per pupil (log) 2.86 0.30 0.16 2.14 3.74 
Note. Unbalanced panel data with 85 observations from 25 OECD countries. GDP per capita is measured in 
current 2000 US $. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Decentralization and student performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decentralization, lagged 0.021+ 0.072* 0.074* 0.088* 0.074* 0.073* 0.059+ 0.062* 0.062+ 0.100* 
 [0.012] [0.031] [0.037] [0.033] [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.031] [0.034] [0.048] 
Population size (log) - -0.765 0.053 -1.244 -1.388 -0.054 -1.847 0.394 -0.266 0.282 
  [1.788] [2.371] [1.905] [1.835] [1.842] [1.838] [1.826] [0.642] [3.204] 
GDP per capita (log) - 0.067 1.812+ 1.056+ 0.0248 0.109 0.197 0.097 -0.128 0.323 
  [0.647] [1.017] [0.598] [0.643] [0.649] [0.645] [0.637] [1.762] [0.948] 
OECD PISA test, year 2000 - 0.465** - - 0.461** 0.442** 0.447** 0.421** 0.528** 0.409* 
  [0.153]   [0.152] [0.151] [0.151] [0.149] [0.147] [0.196] 
Trend - - -0.026 - - - - - - - 
   [0.029]        
- - -  -1.299 - -1.049 - - - Government consumption  
spending as % of GDP (log)     [0.972]  [0.974]    
Gov. cons. * decentralization - - - - - - -0.083 - - - 
       [0.054]    
- - - - - -0.962 - -0.851 -  Social spending  as % of GDP (log) 
     [0.598]  [0.591]   
Social spend.* Decentralization - - - - - - - -0.064+ - - 
        [0.037]   
Primary education spending - - - - - - - - - -0.447 
per pupil as % of GDP (log)          [0.429] 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 84 85 84 85 66 
R-squared 0.0902 0.8524 0.8422 0.8398 0.8667 0.8716 0.8723 0.8786 0.8594 0.8649 
Number of id - 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 23 
R2 within - 0.2890 0.1844 0.1721 0.3114 0.3320 0.3402 0.3681 0.2735 0.3169 
Notes:  ‘+’, ‘*’, ‘**’ denote significances at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
In columns (6) and (7), interacted variables have been centered on the regression sample mean. In column (8), all explanatory variables are included as five years 
moving averages.  
